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1
I've seen the needle and the damage done / A little part of it in everyone.

The Federal Communications Commission's stern response to
incidents like Janet Jackson's "wardrobe malfunction"2 and Bono's
colorful Golden Globe Awards acceptance speech 3 have made it plain
that the Commission still sees its role as protecting the broadcast
audience from indecent content. Meanwhile, Congress has toyed with
increasing penalties for indecency violations in broadcasting 4 and has
attempted to extend broadcast-style content standards to the
Internet. 5 Indeed, despite widespread recognition that the traditional
spectrum scarcity rationale for content regulation of broadcasting is
all but a dead letter, 6 content regulation of broadcasting persists in
forms that would be patently unconstitutional if applied to print
media.
The idea that broadcasting should receive less First
Amendment protection than print and other media is, of course, not
new. What is new is the explosion of new kinds of mass media outlets
and the novel questions they raise about the constitutionality of
broadcast-style
content regulation.
In response to these
developments, several authors have criticized the persistence of the
two-tiered print-versus-broadcasting First Amendment hierarchy as
anachronistic in an age when print, broadcasting, cable, telephone,
and Internet are converging rapidly. 7 However, others offer a starkly
1.
NEIL YOUNG, Needle and the Damage Done, on HARVEST (WEA 1972).
2.
In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning their Feb. 1,
2004, Broad. of the Super Bowl XXXVIII, 19 F.C.C.R. 19230 (2004).
3.
In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding their Airing of the
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4982 (2004) ("We also take this
opportunity to reiterate our recent admonition .. .that serious multiple violations of our
indecency rule by broadcasters may well lead to the commencement of license revocation
proceedings .... ).
4.
See Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004, S.2056, H.R. 3717, 108th Cong.
§ 102 (2004).
5.
See Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) (2000); Child
Online Protection Act (COPA), 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000); see also Ashcroft v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (affirming injunction against enforcement of COPA);
Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down CDA as a First
Amendment violation).
6.
See In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations
Concerning the Gen. Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145,
152 (1985); see also Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to
Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1982); J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunicationsin
Jericho, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1209 (1993) (book review).
7.
See, e.g., Erik S. Knutsen, Techno-neutrality of Freedom of Expression in New
Media Beyond the Internet: Solutions for the United States and Canada, 8 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 87 (2001); Khaldoun Shobaki, Speech Restraints for Converged Media, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 333 (2004). For a novel "structural" approach based on "regulation of the distribution
of media assets, as differentiated from editorial control," see Michael J. Burstein, Towards
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different response: content regulation is needed now more than ever to
protect audiences incapable of dealing with the mass media deluge by
8
themselves.
This tension between advocates of a new media-blind approach
to content regulation and advocates of maintaining the status quo is
not easily resolved on the terms of discussion advanced by these
authors, because both camps make valid, mutually annihilating
points. On the one hand, the technological convergence of media is no
doubt rendering the old legal regime unworkable, as it is now possible
to both read a newspaper and watch a television program by means of
a third medium-the Internet. On the other hand, the ubiquity of new
media means that we are unquestionably living in an age when
audiences are exposed to more mass media than ever before, so that
whatever legitimate reasons may exist for protecting audiences from
mass media are likely to be even more relevant now.
All of which brings us back to the key questions of justification:
Do audiences need the government's protection from mass media? Or
are they capable of choosing media and protecting themselves? For
decades, judicial opinion on this issue developed in the form of judicial
notice, speculation, and assumption. 9 Yet during that time, a rich
social science discipline was emerging that could have helped to
address these issues based on empirical research about mass media
effects and audiences. 10 Given the renewed importance of this issue, it
is time to bridge the gap between the law of mass media content
regulation and the social science research into mass media
consumption. 1
To that end, this article presents an interdisciplinary critique
of the law's assumptions about the effects of mass media on the
audience, the nature of that audience, and how those assumptions
have shaped First Amendment doctrine. Part I reviews important
a New Standardfor FirstAmendment Review of StructuralMedia Regulation, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1030, 1068 (2004).
8.
See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, The Right to Reject: The First Amendment in a
Media-Drenched Society, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 129, 144-45 (2005) ("The growth of a media
society and the corresponding explosion of media speech have made the burdens of averting
one's eyes ever more onerous. Likewise, the demise of social customs which once imposed
an unofficial censorship on offensive speech have put even more burdens on averting one's
eyes, to the point where it may be nearly impossible to avoid offensive speech. This
lopsidedness of burdens has been a natural result of the marketplace [of ideas] metaphor,
which focuses only on increasing the amount of social speech. But during an age of
abundant speech, it is time to reconsider this dramatic inequality of burdens.").
9.
See discussion infra Part I.
10.
See discussion infra Part II.
11.
For an analysis of related concerns in the libel context, see David McCraw, How
Do Readers Read? Social Science and the Law of Libel, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 81 (1991).
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First Amendment rulings concerning content regulation of electronic
media, as well as analogous cases involving non-broadcast speech.
The goal is to identify the judicial assumptions used to justify giving
less First Amendment protection to broadcasting than to other media.
Part II critiques these assumptions against the conclusions of social
science theorists who have been studying the question of mass
communications effects and audiences since the early twentieth
century.
This critique shows that most of the law's current
assumptions about the nature of mass communications are based on
an early, and now discredited, view of mass communications effects
known as the "Hypodermic Needle Model." More sophisticated models
have since supplanted the Hypodermic Needle Model, which failed to
account for the interactive and social dimensions of mass
communication. Finally, Part III returns to the question of how new
media should be treated under the First Amendment and analyzes the
potential impact of the critique presented in Part II on the
development of the law of content regulation in the twenty-first
century.
I. THE MASS MEDIA, THE PASSIVE AUDIENCE, AND THE LAW
This section explores the law's assumptions about the nature of
mass media effects and audiences. Three areas of First Amendment
jurisprudence are relevant to this exploration: compelled access to
media, offensive speech, and Internet content regulation. In each of
these areas, judicial opinion assumes that mass media consumers are
passive, captive, and almost victim-like in their relationship with
mass media, especially with broadcasting. As a result, courts tend to
assume a paternalistic attitude when analyzing media effects
generally and assign less First Amendment protection to broadcast
media in particular because broadcasting is assumed to be more
invasive than other forms of media. This discussion sets the stage for
Part II's critique of these assumptions in light of modern mass
communication effects theory.
A. Compelled Access to Media
1. Public Affairs Speech and the Fairness Doctrine: Banzhaf and CBS
We begin with the D.C. Circuit's decision in Banzhaf v. Federal
Communications Commission12 because it contains the seed language
12.

405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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for subsequent Supreme Court case law addressing broadcast content
regulation. In Banzhaf, the D.C. Circuit upheld an FCC ruling under
the so-called "Fairness Doctrine," requiring broadcasters who aired
cigarette advertising to also provide air time for anti-cigarette
advocates.13
In affirming the FCC's ruling, Judge Bazelon admitted that
"[t]he First Amendment is unmistakably hostile to governmental
controls over the content of the press," but nevertheless reasoned that
"there may still be a meaningful distinction between [print and
broadcast] media justifying different treatment under the First
Amendment." 14 In this passage, Judge Bazelon made clear what he
perceived to be the relevant distinctions:
Written messages are not communicated unless they are read, and reading
requires an affirmative act. Broadcast messages, in contrast, are "in the air." In an
age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes a citizen who does not know some
part of a leading cigarette jingle by heart. Similarly, an ordinary habitual
television watcher can avoid these commercials only by frequently leaving the
room, changing the channel, or doing some other such affirmative act. It is difficult
to calculate the subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda, which may be
heard even if not listened to,
but it may reasonably be thought greater than the
15
impact of the written word.

This passage reflects the court's critical assumptions about the
nature of the broadcasting medium and its audience. The court uses
words like "omnipresent," "subliminal impact," and "pervasive
propaganda" to describe the power of broadcasting-all without
reference to empirical research or other authority.' 6 These words
suggest an assumption that the broadcast medium is capable of
having a powerful effect on its audience because that audience is
passive or even captive while subject to the medium. Judge Bazelon's
characterization of the "ordinary" television viewer as "habitual" in his

13.
Id. at 1085. The Fairness Doctrine, which was largely abandoned by the FCC
under the Reagan administration, see sources cited supra note 6, is probably the most
familiar legal expression of the right-of-access philosophy advocated by Professor Jerome
Barron and others. See generally Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First
Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1641 (1967). In a nutshell, these advocates argue that
monopolistic mass media outlets should be compelled to give access to speakers addressing
issues of public concern in order to preserve the marketplace of ideas that is central to our
system of self-governance against a profit-driven mass media industry that is generally
hostile to ideas.
14.
Banzhaf, 405 F.2d at 1100.
15.
Id. at 1100-01.
16.
Indeed, the court seems to have viewed these kinds of conclusions as being
largely beyond dispute. See, e.g., id. at 1101 n.77 ("[Tihe effectiveness of the television
commercial is hardly disputed, for it alone appeals to both of man's most receptive senses hearing and seeing.").
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or her use of television further underlines this view. 17 The picture
that emerges is of audience members unwilling or unable to exercise
choice over the broadcast messages entering their lives.
Five years after Banzhaf, the Supreme Court adopted Judge
Bazelon's characterization of broadcasting-but with quite different
results. In Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National
Committee (CBS), the Court considered whether the Fairness
Doctrine's "fairness" and "access" components could be used to compel
television and radio stations to carry paid political advertisements.1 8
With approval, the Court quoted Judge Bazelon's stark warning about
the "subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda," 19 and concluded:
The [FCC] is entitled to take into account the reality that in a very real sense
listeners and viewers constitute a "captive audience." The "captive" nature of the
broadcast audience was recognized as early as 1924 when Commerce Secretary
Hoover remarked . . . that "the radio listener does not have the same option that
the reader of publications has-to ignore advertising in which he is not
interested-and he may resent its invasion of his set." As the broadcast media
became more pervasive in our society, the problem has become more acute ....

It is no answer to say that because we tolerate pervasive commercial
20
advertisements we can also live with its political counterparts.

The Court in CBS thus found that neither the Fairness
Doctrine nor the First Amendment required broadcasters to carry
such content. 2 1 Remarkably, the court came to this conclusion using
the same assumptions that drove the opposite result in Banzhaf.22
Specifically, these two cases employ a common underlying assumption
about broadcasting and its audience: broadcasting has a pervasive
presence and a special hold on its audience that other media do not.
In Banzhaf, this assumption required that pro-smoking messages be
"balanced" by compelled anti-smoking messages; 23 in CBS, this same

17.
See id. at 1100.
18.
412 U.S. 94, 97 (1973).
19.
Banzhaf, 405 F.2d at 1100-01.
20.
412 U.S. at 127-28 (citations and footnotes omitted).
21.
See id. at 94.
22.
This outcome was remarkable, because enforcing a right of access for political
advertisements would seem to be an even higher expression of the access philosophy than
forced anti-cigarette messages. Forcing broadcasting outlets to sell time to political
speakers arguably would offset the broadcasters' perceived antipathy, see Barron, supra
note 13, at 1641, to such content even as it allowed the broadcasters to recoup the financial
burden imposed by the corrective measure.
23.
See 405 F.2d at 1086.
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assumption was used to justify what might be viewed as a stand
24
against political propaganda.
2. Access and reply: Red Lion and Tornillo
Another component of the Fairness Doctrine was the "personal
attack" rule which required stations to allow persons whose "honesty,
character, integrity" or other personality traits were attacked to
reply. 25 The FCC required broadcasters to provide this right of access
regardless of whether the person attacked could find a sponsor or
afford to buy airtime, and in the Red Lion case the Supreme Court
endorsed this system of subsidized access, ostensibly due to concerns
that the scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum might result in
monopolization of the broadcast medium by just a few speakers:
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which
is paramount. It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to
countenance monopolization
of the market, whether by the government itself or a
26
private licensee.

The Court reached exactly the opposite conclusion in Miami
Herald v. Tornillo, invalidating a state "right of reply" statute that
required newspapers to devote column space to responses from
27
individuals who were the subject of the newspaper's editorials.
Despite the defendant newspaper's virtual monopoly in the Miami
newspaper market, the Court found that the statute
[Flails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into
the function of editors. A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit
for news, comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper,
and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute
the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how
governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with
the
28
First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.

24.
See 412 US at 128. The resulting irony of these cases is that the right of access a supposed tonic for the ailing marketplace of ideas - does not extend to this most
obviously political type of speech.
25.
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 373-75 (1969) (quoting 47 C.F.R. §
73.123).
26.
Id. at 390 (citations omitted).
27.
418 U.S. 241, 241-42 (1974).
28.
Id. at 258.
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Remarkably, Red Lion is not cited in Tornillo, even though the
comparison was fully briefed by the parties. 29 More remarkably, the
Tornillo court implied that spectrum scarcity, which received
extensive treatment in Red Lion, 30 really is not the operative
difference between newspapers and broadcasters on the right-of-reply
31
question.
If scarcity does not explain the apparent inconsistency between
Red Lion and Tornillo, what does? Perhaps it is this:
Although broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment
interest, differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the
First Amendment standards applied to them....
Just as the Government may limit the use of sound-amplifying equipment
potentially so may the Government limit the use of broadcast equipment. The
right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user of a sound truck, or any other
individual broadcaster, does not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of
32
others.

The Court's tepid observation that broadcasting is "affected by
a First Amendment interest" 33 contrasts sharply with its conclusion in
Tornillo that requiring even a monopolistic newspaper to provide
space for opposing viewpoints is inconsistent with "the First
Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this
time."3 4 This contrast confirms, at a minimum, broadcasting's
subordinate status under the First Amendment. More importantly,
the Court's reliance on "differences in the character" 35 between media
and its questionable comparison of broadcasting to amplified sound
29.
See Brief for Appellant at 20-23, Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(No. 73-797); Brief for Appellee, at 61-64, 68-69, Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (No. 73-797).
30.
See 395 U.S. at 387-96.
31.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256-57 (stating: "[i]t
is correct, as appellee contends, that a
newspaper is not subject to the finite technological limitations of time that confront a
broadcaster but it is not correct to say that, as an economic reality, a newspaper can
proceed to infinite expansion of its column space to accommodate the replies that a
government agency determines or a statute commands the readers should have
available.").
32.
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386-87 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court's
analogy between broadcasting and soundtrucks seems odd, to say the least, given that
people cannot turn-off a blaring soundtruck like they can a radio or television. See infra
note 62. It is also hard to understand the import of the observation that the rights of one
broadcaster do not embrace the right to "snuff out the free speech of others," Red Lion, 395
U.S. at 387, when arguably it is the Court's decision in Red Lion which snuffed out the
right of broadcasters to exercise the same editorial prerogative as the newspaper editors
whose discretion is lionized in Tornillo.
33.
Id. at 386 (emphasis added).
34.
418 U.S. at 258.
35.
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386.
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trucks that "snuff out" the speech of others 36 suggests the powerful
grip of the passive/captive audience assumption upon the Court's
37
imagination.
B. Offensive Speech
The flipside of the access cases are cases addressing limits on
offensive speech. Instead of trying to force more "good" speech into the
marketplace of ideas, as in the access cases, the concern here is
whether "bad" speech can be kept out. Nevertheless, the analysis still
reflects the same kinds of passive audience assumptions, with
broadcast media again receiving markedly less protection than other
38
forms of expression.
39
1. Nonbroadcast Offensive Speech: Cohen and Miller

In Cohen v. California,the defendant was arrested for wearing
a jacket emblazoned with the slogan "Fuck the Draft" in the Los
Angeles County Courthouse. 40
Overturning the conviction, the
Supreme Court noted:
[I]n arguments before this court much has been made of the claim that Cohen's
distasteful mode of expression was thrust upon unwilling or unsuspecting viewers,
and that the State might therefore legitimately act as it did in order to protect the
sensitive from otherwise unavoidable exposure to appellant's crude form of protest.
Of course, the mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not
serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving offense ....
"[W]e are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to
objectionable speech."
The ability of the government, consonant with the
Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in

36.
Id. at 387.
37.
Even more ironic is that the "right of access" to mass media was originally
advocated as a solution to the problem of monopoly newspapers, see Barron, supra note 13,
yet it emerged successfully only in the already-regulated broadcast medium. Indeed, Red
Lion and Tornillo are paired together in many mass communications law textbooks
precisely because they illustrate the Court's willingness to treat broadcasting differently
than other media under the same First Amendment scenarios.
38.
A word of caution is necessary: The goal here is not to try to pin down the
meaning of terms like "obscene" and "indecent." Instead, the focus is on the fact that the
Court sees a viable distinction between such terms and found it appropriate to craft two,
media-dependent answers to what is really the same question: When is offensive speech
protected by the First Amendment?
39.
This discussion of the history of the regulation of non-broadcast offensive speech
is guided by Guy A. Reiss, Indecent Speech on the Air, the Federal Communications
Commission and the First Amendment: An Update, 15 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 435
(1991).
40.
403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
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other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial
privacy interests are
41
being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.

The court further recognized that a speaker often chooses
words precisely for their emotional impact and that this component of
communication "may often be the more important element of the
overall message," and therefore merits constitutional protection. 42
Although Cohen established that states cannot place a blanket
ban on indecent speech, 43 the Court's concern with speech that creates
an "essentially intolerable" invasion of "substantial privacy
interests" 44 left the door open to some regulation of indecent speech
and, in fact, would foreshadow the Supreme Court's subsequent
analysis of indecent broadcast speech.
Before that happened,
however, the holding in Cohen was further refined in Miller v.
California, where the Court held that obscenity-as distinct from
indecency-was not at all protected by the First Amendment. 45 In
Miller, the Court established a test for identifying obscenity that
included a "prurient interests" element, 46 in keeping with earlier
precedent (including Cohen) that "[obscene] expression must be, in
47
some significant way, erotic."
2. The Broadcasting Exception: Pacifica
Just two years after Miller, the government successfully
asserted its right to define and regulate non-obscene speech in
broadcasting in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the famous Seven Dirty
Words case. 48 In Pacifica, the Court upheld FCC sanctions against a
radio station which broadcast a George Carlin monologue entitled
"Filthy Words." 49 The sanctions were based on an FCC order in which
"the FCC attempted to authoritatively construe the term 'indecent' for
the broadcast medium

patently

41.

offensive

as

.

.

.

as 'language that describes, in terms

measured

by

contemporary

community

Id. at 21 (citations and footnotes omitted) (quoting Rowan v. Post Office Dept.,

397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)).
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 26.
Reiss, supra note 39, at 436.
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.

45.

413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).

46.
Id. at 24.
47.
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (citing Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
48.
438 U.S. 726 (1978). Those seven words, including the word that was at issue in
Cohen, are reproduced in the Court's appendix to the Pacifica decision. Id. at app.
49.
Id. at 738.
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standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and
organs.' "50
In Pacifica, the government attempted to regulate speech that
was merely indecent and not obscene, as the FCC's order lacked the
requisite "prurient interest" factor enunciated in the Miller obscenity
formulation; in fact, the district court struck the order down for this
reason, and because of a concern that the order was vague and
overbroad. 51 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld the order. 52 In
his plurality opinion, Justice Stevens cited Cohen for the proposition
that speech can both offend and have "social value." 5 3 Yet unlike
Cohen, where the "social value" of the profanity-emblazoned jacket
outweighed its offensiveness, 54 the Pacifica Court held that the impact
of George Carlin's offensive speech outweighed its value as social
commentary. 55 Why did the Court see fit to depart from Cohen in this
fashion?
One answer lies in the Court's assumptions about the captive
nature of the broadcasting audience and the resulting penetration of
broadcast messages. Noting that "it is undisputed that the content of
Pacifica's broadcast was 'vulgar,' 'offensive,' and 'shocking,' "56 the
Court determined that the level of protection afforded such speech
depended on the "context" of the speech; by "context" the Court
appears to have meant "medium":
[T]he broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives
of all Americans. Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the
home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First
Amendment rights of an intruder. Because the broadcast audience is constantly
tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer
from unexpected program content. To say that one may avoid further offense by
50.
Reiss, supra note 39, at 437 (citing In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica
Found. Station WBAI, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975) [hereinafter In re Pacifica]).
51.
James C. Hsiung, Indecent Broadcast: An Assessment of Pacifica's Impact, 9
COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW 41, 45-46 (1987) (citing In re Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 97).
The FCC put forth four arguments to support its asserted power to sanction, stating:
Broadcasting requires special treatment because of four important
considerations: (1) children have access to radios and in many cases are
unsupervised by parents; (2) radio receivers are in the home, a place where
people's privacy interest is entitled to extra deference; (3) unconsenting adults
may tune in a station without any warning that offensive language is being or
will be broadcast; and (4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which
the government must therefore license in the public interest.
In re Pacifica,56 F.C.C.2d at 97 (citations omitted).
52.
Pacifica,438 U.S. at 751.
53.
Id. at 747.
54.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
55.
Pacifica,438 U.S. at 747-51.
56.
Id. at 747.
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turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow. One may hang up on an
indecent phone call, but that option does not give the
57 caller a constitutional
immunity or avoid a harm that has already taken place.

As in Banzhaf, this language strikingly depicts an audience
almost helpless in the face of broadcasting's power and reach, with the
result being the invention of "pervasive presence"5 8 as a new rationale
for broadcast content regulation completely independent of the
traditional spectrum scarcity rationale. 59
Further, the opinion
approved the regulation of non-obscene, merely indecent speech in
broadcasting, freeing the FCC from "the clash between its statutory
mandates and the first amendment rights of broadcasters" and giving
it "the regulatory flexibility to apply either the obscenity definition
60
under Miller or the indecency rationale under Pacifica."
3. Discussion
Despite their contrasting outcomes, concerns about the effect of
speech on a potentially captive audience link Cohen to Pacifica. While
striking down a ban on indecent speech, the Cohen Court noted that
audiences are often "captives" of others' speech and observed that
circumstances might exist where speech invades "substantial privacy
interests" in an "essentially intolerable manner," thus justifying
otherwise unconstitutional
efforts to protect "unwilling or
unsuspecting viewers." 6 1
This budding rationale for content
regulation blossomed in Pacifica, when the Court suggested that
broadcasting's "uniquely pervasive presence" haunts apparently
helpless audience members in their own homes, taking on the
characteristics of an "intruder," justifying regulation of indecent
62
broadcast speech.
57.
Id. at 748-49 (citation omitted).
58.
Id. at 748.
59.
See Hsiung, supra note 51, at 47.
60.
Id.
61.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
62.
See 438 U.S. at 748-49. The Court's choice of words in these cases is intriguing,
because neither "captivity" nor "privacy" would seem at first blush to fit. Unlike speech in
public spaces, speech in private places like homes and cars does not ordinarily enter
without some affirmative act by the recipient - televisions and radios must at least be
turned on, newspapers at least unfolded and read, even an offensive slogan on a jacket
remains outside unless the jacket's wearer is invited in. Captivity may be an appropriate
way to think about these media in the public forum context, but besides the occasional
soundtruck, this concept doesn't really fit the private space context very well; likewise, it
cannot be "privacy" in the traditional sense that the Court is concerned about, since privacy
arguably includes the right to listen to George Carlin in one's own home. In fact, a good
argument can be made that, if physical captivity is the real worry in these cases, then the
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These cases thus suggest that the Court generally (i.e., even in
the nonbroadcast context) views audience members as either passive
receivers of mass media, unwilling or unlikely to disengage from
speech media freely, or as outright captives simply unable to
disengage freely. The Court also assumes that broadcast speech
exacerbates this problem because of the uniquely "pervasive presence"
for greater
of television and radio, 6 3 which in turn implies the need
64
"contexts."
media
other
in
than
regulation
and
concern
C. Content Regulation of the Internet
The last stop in this review of cases is Reno v. ACLU, a case in
which the Supreme Court struck down legislation aimed at curbing
"indecency" on the Internet. 65 At first blush, this case appears to run
counter to the themes of this article, given that the Reno Court

outcomes in Cohen and Pacifica are exactly backwards:

Cohen's fellow citizens in the

courthouse truly are physically captive, because while radios and TVs can be turned off or
tuned to different programs to at least interrupt the flow of unwelcome speech, there really
is no other place to transact courthouse business except at the courthouse, and thus no real
option but to encounter firsthand any potentially offensive slogans that may be emblazoned
upon the jackets of other courthouse visitors.
Justice Douglas made a similar point about a decade earlier in his dissent in Public
Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). There, the Court upheld a city bus
company's authority to use the public address systems on its buses to play news, music,
and commercials, on the theory that persons who used the buses implicitly waived their
privacy interest in avoiding unwanted speech. See id. at 463-64 ("However complete his
right of privacy may be at home, it is substantially limited by the rights of others when its
possessor travels on a public thoroughfare or rides in a public conveyance.") Justice
Douglas disagreed, writing, "[o]ne who tunes in on an offensive program at home can turn
it off or tune in another station, as he wishes. One who hears disquieting or unpleasant
programs in public places, such as restaurants, can get up and leave. But the man on the
streetcar has no choice but to sit and listen, or perhaps to sit and try not to listen." Id. at
469 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Curiously, just four years before its holding in Pacifica, the
Court seemed to catch up with Justice Douglas's thinking, upholding a local ban on
political advertising in city buses because the viewer or listener is captive and the degree of
captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer to avoid exposure. See generally
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). More curious still is the fact that
Judge Bazelon made essentially the same point in his circuit court concurrence striking
down the FCC's order in Pacifica: "Unlike the sound truck whose noise cannot be
eliminated from the home even if desired, radio makes no sound unless a person
voluntarily purchases it, bring[s] [sic] it home and then switches it 'on.' " Pacifica Found. v.
FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
63.
See Theodore L. Glasser & Harvey Jassem, Indecent Broadcasts and the
Listener's Right of Privacy, 24 J. BROADCASTING 285, 292-93 (1980).
In this light, it is interesting to note that the Court in Pacifica recognized the
64.
validity of the comparison between Red Lion and Tornillo, but only in a tautological way:
The Court noted the existence of these two cases as evidence that broadcasting is afforded
less protection than print. 438 U.S. at 748.
521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
65.
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conferred upon an emerging electronic medium the kind of speech
freedom that is traditionally associated with print media rather than
broadcast media. 66 However, a closer look reveals that, in arriving at
that result, the Court generalized from Pacifica and concluded that
the constitutionality of content regulation of a given medium depends
in significant measure on whether that medium is used passively or
67
interactively.
The two statutory provisions invalidated in Reno prohibited
persons from knowingly transmitting "obscene or indecent" content, or
making such content available, to persons younger than 18 years of
age. 68
The government argued that Pacifica and its "pervasive
presence" rationale applied to this emerging medium, an argument
that is particularly fascinating in the context of the present analysis:
The approach Congress enacted is constitutional under Pacifica. Like broadcast
stations, the Internet is establishing an increasingly "pervasive presence" in the

lives of Americans.

Like indecency presented on broadcast stations, indecent

material presented over the Internet "confronts the citizen ... in the privacy of the
home." Like broadcast stations, the Internet "is uniquely accessible to children."
Moreover, in important ways, there is a stronger justification for the restriction at
issue here than there was for the one approved in Pacifica. Because millions of
people disseminate information on the Internet without the intervention of editors,
network censors, or market disincentives, the indecency problem on the Internet is
much more pronounced than it is on broadcast stations .... 69

The Supreme Court's rejection of this argument is also
intriguing because of the doors it leaves open:
[The Federal Communications] Commission's order [in Pacifica] applied to a
medium which as a matter of history had "received the most limited First
Amendment protection," in large part because warnings could not adequately
protect the listener from unexpected program content. The Internet, however, has
no comparable history. Moreover, the District Court found that the risk of
encountering indecent material by accident is remote
because a series of
70
affirmative steps is required to access specific material.

The import of the Court's "history" observation seems unclear.
Either the Court is speaking tautologically (it is okay to subordinate
the First Amendment rights of broadcasters because we have always
done so) or it is making a suggestion (if the government can establish
some history of regulation of the Internet, then maybe content
regulation will be okay later). Additionally, the idea that the Internet

66.
67.
68.
69.
U.S. 844
70.

See id.
See id. at 869-70.
Id. at 859 (emphasis added) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) (Supp. II 1997)).
Reply Brief for the Appellants at 28-30, Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521
(1997) (No. 96-511) (citations omitted).
Reno, 521 U.S. at 867 (citations omitted).
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is "safer" because it requires more "affirmative" steps to get to
indecent material than other media is open to criticism, both
empirically and as a doctrinal matter. 71 Nevertheless, what is clear is
that Reno reaffirms the Court's medium-is-the-message approach to
the First Amendment, with the Court ruling that because audiences
use the Internet more like a newspaper than a television-that is,
interactively rather than passively-the Internet receives essentially
72
the same high level of First Amendment protection as newspapers.
D. Summary
From Banzhaf to Red Lion to Pacifica to Reno, courts have
expressed an assumption that broadcast audiences are particularly
vulnerable because they are passive rather than interactive, captive
rather than in control, and even victims rather than knowing users.
As Part II demonstrates, however, these key assumptions are based
more on science fiction than social science research.
II. THE MASS MEDIA, THE AUDIENCE, AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
RESEARCH

Part I demonstrates that judicial assumptions about the media
audience explain why the Supreme Court endorses a two-tier First
Amendment hierarchy, with traditional electronic media receiving less
protection than print and Internet media. In this section, these
71.
See Knutsen, supra note 7, at 104-06 ("Likening one media form to another based
on the complexity of required affirmative steps to receive the communication seems to be a
way to differentiate between whether or not inappropriate content would be accessible by
children. However, one only has to think about the actual act of listening to a radio
broadcast, dialing a telephone, or logging on to the Internet. The affirmative steps
required to place a telephone call are really not that much more onerous than turning a
radio dial or clicking a mouse. The degree of accessibility issue as it affects children is
perhaps more salient in the court's mind, yet it forsakes the governmental objective of
protection by assuming that only adults could perform more complex steps to access
controversial media.").
72.
Judicial analysis of cable and direct broadcast satellite (DBS) has been more
ambiguous in this regard, although the trend appears to be in the direction of imposing less
restriction on these media than upon broadcasting. See also Joel Timmer, The Seven Dirty
Words You Can Say on Cable and DBS: Extending Broadcast Indecency Regulation and
the First Amendment, 10 COMM. L. & POL'Y 179, 196-204 (2005) (noting conflicting holdings
by lower courts as to whether the scarcity rationale applies to DBS, which provides for
roughly four times the channels as most cable systems and 40 times as many channels as
ordinary broadcasting). Compare Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., v. FCC,
518 U.S. 727 (1996) (plurality decision finding that cable is has attained a "pervasive
presence in the lives of all Americans") with U.S. v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803
(2000) (citing Reno and apparently applying strict scrutiny to cable indecency regulations,
with no mention of "pervasive presence").
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assumptions are critiqued, using the work of sociologists and mass

communications researchers who have studied issues relating to mass
media effects, audiences, and uses since the early 20th Century.
A. Early Mass Communications Theory

The origins of mass communications effects theory lie in "early
concerns that propaganda transmitted through the mass press or over
radio could have a nearly universal effect ...and could lead to a mass

or mob reaction." 73 To fully understand why this concern was once
paramount, one must appreciate the historical context from which the
earliest mass communications theories emerged:
The initial assumption about the effects of mass media by social scientists in
the 1920s and 1930s was that mass communication techniques were quite potent.
For example, in an analysis of mass communication during World War I, Lasswell
(1927) concluded that "propaganda is one of the most powerful instrumentalities in
the modern world." During this period, there were several salient examples of
seemingly effective mass communication effects.
These included the panic
following the 1929 stock market crash; the well-publicized mass hysteria following
the radio broadcast of Orson Wells' War of the Worlds in 1938; and the rise in
popularity of individuals such as Adolf Hitler in Germany, and the right wing
Catholic priest Father Coughlin, and Louisiana Senator Huey Long in the United
74
States.

Two theoretical constructs abetted these views of mass
communications effects: the Mass Audience and the Hypodermic
Needle Model of mass communication (the latter also known as the
Direct Effects Model). 75 The Mass Audience concept has four
characteristics associated with the sociological definition of the term
mass
First, its membership may come from all walks of life, and from all distinguishable
social strata .... Secondly, the mass is an anonymous group, or more exactly, is
composed of anonymous individuals. Third, there exists little interaction or
exchange of experience between the members of the mass .... Fourth, the mass is
very loosely organized and is not able to act with the concertedness or unity that
76
marks the crowd.

73.
JOSHUA MEYROWITZ, No SENSE OF PLACE 13 (1985).
74.
Richard E. Petty, Joseph R. Priester, & Pablo Brinol, Mass Media Attitude
Change: Implications of the Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion, in MEDIA
EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 155, 156 (Jennings Bryant, Dolf Zillmann
eds., 2002) [hereinafter Petty] (citations omitted).
75.
CHARLES R.WRIGHT, MASS COMMUNICATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 8586 (3d ed. 1986).
76.
Herbert Blumer, Collective Behavior, in PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY, 185-86
(Alfred McClung Lee ed., 1946) (emphasis added) (also quoted in WRIGHT, supra note 75, at
85).
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The view of the audience as "separate atoms that together
comprise the whole" 77 was coupled with the Hypodermic Needle Model
of the communications process which holds that:
[T]he mass media affect all audience members directly by reaching each person as
a socially isolated individual, directly influencing his or her knowledge, opinions,
attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. . . . Each individual in the mass audience is
regarded as directly and personally "struck" by the medium's message. Once the
message has struck someone, it may or may
not have influence, depending on
78
whether or not it is potent enough to "take."

Not surprisingly, a stark and even sinister view of mass
communications in general, and broadcasting in particular, emerged
from this period. This view was crystallized by the assumption that
"the audience was captive, attentive, and gullible . . . the citizenry sat
glued to the radio, helpless victims '79 and that "propaganda could be
80
made almost irresistible."
These early fears pervade the case law, sometimes explicitly so.
Commerce Secretary Hoover's observation about the inability of the
radio listener to escape advertising-which the Supreme Court quoted
with approval in CBS-date from this era and came just three years
81
before Lasswell's study of World War I propaganda noted above.
From Banzhaf's references to "pervasive propaganda," "omnipresent
radio," and broadcasting's "subliminal impact . . . greater than the
impact of the written word,"8' 2 to Pacifica's warnings about the
"pervasive presence" of broadcasting,8 3 all the way to Reno's effort to
determine the First Amendment status of the nascent Internet based
on the degree of interactivity required to reach indecent materials8 4 the case law is laden with early Twentieth Century concerns about
audience passivity and broadcasting's resulting special power to
directly implant messages in this audience, necessitating government
oversight, not unlike the way the government regulates illegal drugs
in order to prevent drug addiction and abuse.8 5 But while the law has

77.

WRIGHT, supra note 75, at 86.

78.
79.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Petty, et al., supra note 74 (quoting D.O. Sears & R. Kosterman, Mass Media and

Political Persuasion, in PERSUASION:

PSYCHOLOGICAL INSIGHTS AND PERSPECTIVE 251,

254 (T.C. Brock and S. Shavitt eds., 1994)).
80.
Petty, et al., supra note 74(quoting D. 0. SEARS & R.E. WHITNEY, POLITICAL
PERSUASION (1973).
81.
Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. 412 U.S. 94, 127-28 (1973).
82.
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
83.
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
84.
See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 854 (1997).
85.
Similarly, the fact that early models of mass communications effects were
inspired by early concerns about broadcast political propaganda helps to make sense of the
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continued to cling to these very early assumptions, mass
communications theorists began to question them almost immediately.
B. Early Critiques
The first major challenges to the Hypodermic Needle Model
came as a result of empirical research that questioned the assumption
that media have the power to directly produce effects among audience
members, such as inciting them to mob violence or compelling them to
favor a particular political candidate.8 6 These researchers concluded
that mass communications is better understood as an "indirect"
process, mediated by factors including audience members' prior
attitudes and social relations.8 7 A 1948 study of the 1940 presidential
election concluded that "the media appeared to reinforce people's
already existing attitudes rather than producing new ones," and
subsequent research suggested that changes in people's attitudes
could be the result of a "two-step" process in which mass media first
influence the beliefs of "opinion leaders" who in turn were responsible
for changing the views of the masses through more traditional, social
88
means of persuasion.
This revised view of mass communications, which developed
through the 1950s and 1960s has been referred to as the
"transactional model," and it concludes that the old assumptions about
a passive audience and powerful media were both overblown and
simplistic, as they ignored the interactive character of the
media/audience relationship:
In contrast to the earlier "hypodermic needle" or "bullet" model that posited strong
communications effects, the essential notion of the transactional model is that
mass media effects are quite limited.
Individual characteristics, attitudes,
experiences, and predispositions all mediate mass media effects. As some have put
it, the conceptual shift was to change
the focus from "what media do to people," to
'8 9
"what people do to mass media."

In sum, the "general failure of researchers to demonstrate clear
and direct effects of media content on social behavior" led to the
otherwise puzzling outcome in CBS, where the Court cited Banzhaf to justify its refusal to
compel broadcasters to carry controversial political advertisements. See supra Part I.A.
86.
Petty, supra note 74, at 157.
87.
Id.
88.
Id. at 158 (citations omitted).
89.
David W. Stewart, Paulos Pavlou, & Scott Ward, Media Influences on Marketing
Communications, in MEDIA EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 353, 364
(Jennings Bryant, Dolf Zillmann eds., 2002) (citing Herbert E. Krugman, The Impact of
Television Advertising: Learning Without Involvement, 29 PUB. OPINION Q. 349 (1965) and
Herbert E. Krugman, The Measurement of Advertising Involvement, 30 PUB. OPINION Q.
583 (1967)).
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widespread abandonment of the Hypodermic Needle model among
social scientists, whose attention increasingly turned to models that
consider variables reflecting the social nature of media consumption,
such as "[i]ndividual differences, group differences, the role of
influential peers, [and] stages of cognitive development." 90
C. One Modern Approach: The Uses and GratificationsModel
The strongest expression of the modern, interactive approach
to studying the mass communications process is the Uses and
Gratifications Model:
In this model, people, even young children, are not passive recipients of or reactors
to media stimuli; rather they are purposive and conscious selectors of messages
that fulfill personal needs . . . . This approach turns the old stimulus-response
model on its head. It suggests that it is not so much that the media
affect people,
91
as it is that people selectively use, and thereby affect, the media.

The Uses and Gratifications approach emerged from the
conceptual shifts of the 1950s and 1960s and came into its own in the
1970s and 1980s. 92 Uses and Gratifications research demonstrates
that "audience members exhibit some independence and diversity in
linking gratifications to media messages," thus revealing a much more
active audience than the discredited passive-audience models
93
previously assumed.
Indeed, Uses and Gratifications research poses a stark contrast
to the old Hypodermic Needle assumptions reflected in the case law
suggesting that mass media audiences are monolithically passive or
even captive. In Uses and Gratifications, audience activity "is the core
concept," tempered by the observation that audiences are "variably 94
not universally - active; they are not equally active at all times."
For example, a study of television audiences in the 1980s described
two kinds
of television use,
Escapism
and
Information
9
5
Seeking/Education.
The Escapist user "uses television out of habit
90.
MEYROWITZ, supra note 73, at 13.
91.
Id. at 14.
92.
For a decade-by-decade overview of the development of the Uses and
Gratifications approach, see Thomas E. Ruggiero, Uses and GratificationsTheory in the 21 t
Century, 3 MASS COMM. & SOC'Y 3 (2000).
93.
David L. Swanson, Gratification Seeking, Media Exposure, and Audience
Interpretations: Some Directionsfor Research, 31 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA
237, 238 (1987).
94. Alan M. Rubin, The Uses-and-GratificationsPerspective of Media Effects, in
MEDIA EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 525, 534 (Jennings Bryant, Dolf
Zillmann eds., 2002).
95.
See generally Alan M. Rubin, Television Uses and Gratifications:The Interaction
of Viewing Patternsand Motivations, 27 J. BROADCASTING 37 (1983).
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because television viewing provides

amusement and enjoyment." 96
Seeking user

In comparison, the Information

[U]ses television to seek information or to learn, and not for escape ....
It
highlights the active seeking of messages to gratify certain needs and provides a
contrast to the habitual, entertainment motivational structure that found
gratification in increased television watching, but not in specific program content.
The informational viewers are obviously not trying to escape from an information
environment, but rather, are using television - and specific genres of informational
programming - in order to learn about people, places, and events .... 97

Thus, far from being passive or "captive" victims of
broadcasting, modern studies, like this one, suggest that people are
more or less active users of broadcasting. This study, in particular,
suggests two ways people actively seek out and use broadcasting:
escape and education. The escape use depends on the aesthetic
qualities of the television medium, while the education use depends on
informational content of the message (and, we may suppose, to some
degree on the aesthetic advantages of the medium in conveying that
information).
The former seek gratification from the aesthetic
qualities of television, while the latter seek out the messages that
television carries.
Nevertheless, both are conscious uses of the
medium.
A second example of 1980s Uses and Gratifications research
makes the point even more clearly. An examination of religious
television viewers found that "[a]s with their secular television
viewing counterparts, many regular viewers of religious programs
appear to be purposeful and selective information seekers."9 8 The
study posits a third type of television user:
According to these findings, there exists a type of viewer who is generally
dissatisfied with commercial television programming and typically avoids such
fare. Seeking the spiritual guidance and moral support not typically found in
secular programming, these viewers purposefully select religious television as an
alternative. They have chosen . . . to seek an alternative to the plethora of
available commercial programming as a response to their general dissatisfaction.
It should be noted that there is evidence to suggest that this type of viewer is
not unique to religious television .... 99

This identification of the "reactionary" 10 0 user (or simply a
reactionary use) further undermines the passive audience assumption.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 48.
Id. at 50.
Robert Abelman, Religious Television Uses and Gratifications, 31
BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 293, 304 (1987) (citations omitted).
99.
Id.
100. Id.

J.
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When people did not like what they saw on TV, they changed the
channel to find something they did.101
Although the notion that audiences are active is the sine qua
non of the Uses and Gratifications approach, researchers in this area
have cautioned against simplistic depictions of audience members as
"superational and very selective" 10 2 and have noted that
[Tiheoretical active audience models have increasingly emerged that range from
high audience activity to low levels of involvement. For example, both dependency
and deprivation theories suggest that some individuals under certain conditions
low income, and some forms of stress form high
such as confinement to the home,
103
levels of attachment to media.

Still, even this kind of "dependent use" of mass media
represents a use of mass media, as opposed to a mass media use of
audiences, and thus this use model stands in contrast to the
Hypodermic Needle Model assumptions that the mass media audience
is a monolithic and passive audience, wholly at the mercy of
broadcasters.
D. Summary
Most mass media researchers would regard the current judicial
assumptions about media audiences as anachronistic and lacking in
empirical support. Modern approaches to mass communications
research, such as the Uses and Gratifications approach, examine
media in its social setting and uncover an interactive media/audience
relationship, not a passive one. 10 4 These conclusions raise questions
101. At this point, the reader may be reminded of the Court's observation in Pacifica:
"To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent
language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow."
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978). Thus, it might be argued, even if
reactionary viewers exercise some choice in finding other programs to watch, the "damage"
has already been done. In response, it has to be asked how this experience is any different
from reading an unexpectedly profane quote in a newspaper article. The answer is that it
is not-except for the medium involved. And that is the point: The assumption in Pacifica
that even a fleeting exposure to George Carlin's dirty words over the radio could result in
some kind of unacceptable psychic injury smacks of the Hypodermic Needle model fears
about the sinister power of broadcasting, especially when the rules governing similar
content in print are so much more permissive.
102. Rubin, supra note 94, at 534 (quoting S. Windahl, Uses and Gratificationsat the
Crossroads,2 MASS COMMS. REV. Y.B. 176).
103. Ruggiero, supra note 92, at 8.
104. It should be understood that Uses and Gratifications is but one approach to the
study of mass communications. Another, more traditional approach (or collection of
approaches), is referred to as the "media effects" approach. "The primary difference
between the two traditions is that a media-effects researcher 'most often looks at the mass
communication process from the communicator's end,' whereas a uses [and gratifications]
researcher begins with the audience member." Rubin, supra note 94, at 533 (quoting
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about the continued viability of the current judicial approach to
content regulation.
III. THE NEW MEDIA, THE INTERACTIVE AUDIENCE, AND THE FUTURE
OF THE LAW

Mass communications researchers have understood for decades
that audience members are not anonymous, passive victims of mass
media. They are variably active users within diverse social contexts.
These conclusions contrast significantly with the passive, monolithic
audience assumptions underlying decades of media regulation case
law. What impact, if any, might the application of more current
understandings of mass media have upon the future of the law? To
illustrate the possibilities of this line of interdisciplinary analysis, this
section returns to the likely flashpoint for future content regulation
debates-the Internet and related new media-and argues that the
empirical findings of Uses and Gratifications researchers may be
effective in redefining the First Amendment analysis.
Although congressional efforts to regulate indecent Internet
speech within Reno's
constitutional limits have been largely
unsuccessful to date, the Court may be more receptive to such
measures in the future, for the simple reason that much of Reno's
reasoning was based on the state of the Internet circa 1996.105 At that
time, the Court could plausibly describe the Internet as "comparable,
from the readers' viewpoint, to ...

a vast library including millions of

readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling mall
offering goods and services." 10 6 But that description hardly scratches
the surface of what the Internet and related technologies provide
today. The wider availability of broadband Internet access means
more and more people receive bandwidth-intensive, broadcast-like
content on their computers, which in some cases is preferred to
Windahl, supra note 102, at 176). Rubin notes that some have called for the synthesis of
these approaches, arguing that despite their differing orientations, both "seek to explain
the outcomes or consequences of mass communication." Id. In any case, the important
point is that there is little disagreement about the obsolescence of the original Hypodermic
Needle model's frightening vision of mass media producing direct effects in a mass
audience. For example, one scholar who argues that media are capable of "strong" effects
concedes that such effects are "relatively rare" and, more importantly, are not direct but
rather the product of "intermedia processes" such as interpersonal communications
inspired by especially spectacular media content. See Everett M. Rogers, Intermedia
Processes and Powerful Media Effects, in MEDIA EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND
RESEARCH 199, 211 (Jennings Bryant, Dolf Zillmann eds., 2002).
105. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd,
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
106. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
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"ordinary" broadcast content of the same subject. 10 7 This "TV on the
Internet" phenomenon raises the "risk of encountering indecent
material by accident," if such material is contained in an Internet
"broadcast."10 8 Similarly, the advent of podcasting and video blogging
(vlogging) revive the government's expressed concerns about the
absence of "editors, network censors, or market disincentives" 10 9
capable of informally constraining the content of the new medium.
Meanwhile, WiFi, distributed computing, popups, and convergence
devices are giving new meaning to the phrase "pervasive presence." 110
Taken together, these innovations and others to come make it
pretty clear that when the Reno Court chose to base its reasoning on
the state of Internet technology, it ensured the obsolescence of its own
reasoning.1 ' As a result, what appeared to be a landmark free speech
case will likely come to be regarded as a quaint historical artifact,
addressing the constitutional status of a medium that no longer
exists.1 12 And so long as the assumptions that drove Banzhaf, Red
Lion, and Pacifica - that passive audiences need protection from
"pervasive" media - remain unquestioned, greater content regulation
113
of tomorrow's Internet is a significant possibility.

107. Saul Hansell, More People are Watching Their Programs on the Web, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2005, at C2.
108. Reno, 521 U.S. at 867.
109. See also, e.g., Reply Brief for the Appellants at 29, Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511).
110. Moreover, this technological convergence is accompanied by "increasing
integration of the media industry such that large companies now play multiple roles in the
content production and delivery process." Burstein, supra note 7, at 1045.
111. Indeed, the Court has already signaled its sensitivity to the impact of rapid
technological change in its internet case law. See Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union,
542 U.S. 656, 671-72 (2004). In Ashcroft, the Court justified upholding a preliminary
injunction on COPA (Congress's follow-up to the CDA) and remanded for further factfinding, in part due to the fact that "the factual record does not reflect current technological
reality-a serious flaw in any case involving the Internet." Id. at 671. The Court found it
"reasonable to assume that . . . technological developments important to the First
Amendment analysis" may have occurred between the time that enforcement of the statute
was first enjoined in 1999 and the Supreme Court's decision five years later. Id.
112. Instead, we can expect problems like this: Suppose I plug my iPod into my iMac,
surf over to the Atlantica Internetwork site, and click download on their podcast of the day,
which, unbeknownst to me, includes a program on race relations featuring a searing
excerpt from a Chris Rock monologue. I take my iPod and my go for a drive with my fouryear-old son, and you know what happens next. The scenario is indistinguishable from
Pacifica when examined in terms of the supposed harm-exposure of children to offensive
speech. With regard to the intentionality or passivity of the audience, it is also
indistinguishable, in that I could not have a complete idea of what was contained in the
podcast until I listened to it.
113. At least under the law; it is an open question whether as a practical matter this
global medium can be effectively regulated.
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If, however, these judicial assumptions are proven false, then
the outcome could be very different, in two related respects. First, it
becomes easier to argue that Pacifica was wrongly decided. Pacifica
represents an exception to the general First Amendment rule, and if it
can be shown to be based on unsubstantiated assumptions about mass
communications effects, then there is no demonstrated basis for
departing from the default First Amendment protections afforded to
non-broadcast media. 114 Second, it becomes possible to affirmatively
argue in favor of extending the highest level of First Amendment
protection to all media based on the empirically-demonstrable
conclusion that audiences actively use media.1 1 5

114. Indeed, without the cover of "pervasive presence" and all the rest of the
discredited Hypodermic Needle Model-inspired language, the print/broadcast dichotomy
becomes a patent absurdity. For example, in America today, a notably outspoken rock
musician cannot lawfully describe the honor of receiving a Golden Globe Award as, "really,
really, fucking brilliant" - at least, not on prime-time television. Yet one can lawfully read
about what the singer illegally said here in this article, or in a music magazine, or, for that
matter, in the FCC's own decision in this matter posted on its website, in which it found
the word "fucking" to be impermissibly "profane" regardless of the context in which it is
uttered (except, presumably, when that context is an FCC decision posted on a website
accessible to adults and children.) See Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees
Regarding Their Airing of the Golden Globe Awards Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004).
115. As noted above, some have responded to the development of new media by
arguing that the line on content regulation should be held and maybe even strengthened in
a media saturated society. See Garry, supra note 8. But even advocates of "platformneutral" approaches seem to have some difficulty getting past the old passive audience
assumptions. See e.g. Shobaki, supra note 7, at 353-56. Shobaki argues that speech
questions should be analyzed based upon several factors which seem to be aimed at exactly
the question of whether media consumption is active or passive and which the article
argues are generically applicable to all media, including "initiation of communication,"
"scope of authorization," "scope of audience," and "level of interactivity." Id. Yet the
application of these ideas raises questions about whether they offer new outcomes or
simply new rationales for the status quo. For example, Shobaki argues that
There are two basic forms of communication initiation: pull and push. ...
Browsing the web, reading a newspaper and making a phone call are all
examples of pulling content. Push interactions are those in which a speaker
makes contact with a listener. The speaker organizes and provides content.
Television, radio, streaming Internet content, pop-up ads, and spam are
examples of push.
Id. at 353. These categories seem to be euphemisms for "active" and "passive" media use, a
process of categorization that, in the absence of some rigorous empirical method, is likely to
result in some arbitrary judgments. For example, it is not clear whether this typology
regards the act of receiving a phone call as a pull or push communication. Nor is it clear
why turning on the television in order to obtain news is not an act of "pulling content."
Shobaki's discussion of "scope of authorization" raises similar problems. The article
argues, "[i]f the listener has not sought out contact, there can be no authorization. Lack of
authorization for push interactions raises the privacy concerns that the Court expressed in
Pacifica." Id. at 354. But how can it be that persons who turn on a radio and tune in to a
specific frequency have not "sought out contact?" The article also argues that, on the "pull"
side,
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Already, Uses and Gratifications research regarding Internet
use has provided conclusions that lend support to these kinds of legal
innovations. For example, an empirical study of 308 individuals' use
of political websites concludes that:
When individuals connect to political sites, it is likely they do so with goal-oriented
purposes rather than just for the sake of entertainment gratifications offered by
the Web at large. Therefore, guidance and information seeking/surveillance needs
may be linked to more purposeful uses of the Web than just connecting for the sake
of idle surfing. These findings support the work of [other Uses and Gratifications
researchers] who have suggested that people
use the Internet instrumentally
116
rather than as a habit or to simply pass time.

Another study notes that the Internet is used as a response to
dissatisfaction with other media channels, a finding that is
reminiscent of the 1980s study of religious television users discussed
in Part III and a further illustration of the active nature of the
117
audience.
These studies and those described in Part II directly challenge
the discredited assumptions that audiences are uniformly passive and
captive. Instead, the research demonstrates that audiences tend to
use media purposefully to gratify desires as diverse as the individuals
themselves. Those conclusions should represent a major obstacle to
any future reliance on Pacifica as a basis for content regulation of new
media-or any media, for that matter, including broadcasting.
IV. CONCLUSION

This
article
demonstrates
that
antiquated
mass
communications theories played a significant role in the Court's
[A] speaker who attends a George Carlin comedy show should expect to hear
humor that may be offensive. On the other hand, if a listener tunes in to a local
news radio station, he would not expect to hear Carlin's monologue; hence, the
broadcast would be outside the scope of authorization.
Id. at 354-55. But the principal reason that one does not expect to hear indecent speech on
the radio is because it is unlawful (at least during daylight hours), not because there is
something intrinsic to the radio medium that makes such content unexpected. As for "level
of interactivity," Shobaki's assertion that "[i]n classic broadcast television, there is no user
interaction," is debatable at least in its mechanical meaning, as turning the television on
and off and changing the channel are all interactions (limited ones in comparison to the
internet but at least on a par with print). Id. at 356.
116. Barbara K. Kaye and Thomas J. Johnson, Online and in the Know: Uses and
Gratifications of the Web for Political Information, 46 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC
MEDIA 54, 67 (2002) (citations omitted).
117. Zizi Papacharissi and Alan M. Rubin, Predictors of Internet Use, 44 J.
BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 175 (2000) ("The relationships between Internet
motives and the social and psychological antecedents support the use of the Internet as a
functional alternative for Internet users for whom other channels were not as available or
rewarding.").
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creation of a two-tier First Amendment analysis. That analysis
continues to subordinate broadcasting based on its "pervasive
presence" and the assumed impact of that presence on a mass
audience that is passive and captive.
While these assumptions
pervade the law, social scientists studying mass communications have
dispelled fears of direct media effects and have uncovered more active,
purposeful patterns of mass media consumption. These findings
undermine the "pervasive presence" rationale that currently sustains
content regulation of broadcasting and harmonize with traditional,
liberal approaches to free speech as manifested in the Court's
treatment of print media and (so far) the Internet.
Today, with the Internet and other new media poised to
assume many of the roles formerly assumed by broadcast media,
policy makers are looking with renewed vigor at justifications like
''pervasive presence" to perpetuate broadcasting-like content
regulation into the future. Modern mass communications research,
not to mention the command and purpose of the First Amendment,
counsels otherwise.

